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CHAPTER3 On the Meaning and Impact of the 
Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases 
Yale Kamisar 
I read every newspaper article I could find on the mean-
ing and impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's June 1997 decisions in Wash-
ington v Glucksberg 1 and Vacca v QuilP I came away with the impression 
that some proponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) were unable or 
unwilling publicly to recognize the magnitude of the setback they suffered 
when the Court handed down its rulings in the PAS cases. 
On Being Given "The Green Light" 
The press reported that Barbara Coombs Lee, Executive Director of Com-
passion in Dying (an organization that counsels people considering PAS and 
one of the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg case), was "really thrilled" that the 
Supreme Court had given her organization and her allies "a green light" to 
seek legislation authorizing PAS.3 But proponents of PAS have always had 
"the green light" to persuade state legislatures to legalize PAS. The issue 
presented by Glucksberg and Quill was whether the U.S. Constitution re-
quired or compelled the states to legalize PAS under certain circumstances, 
not whether the states were permitted to do so. 
Early in the oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens 
asked the attorney representing Washington State whether it was his view 
that a legislature had "the constitutional authority to authorize assisted sui-
cide" and the answer was an unequivocal "yes."4 A short time later, Justice 
Ginsburg asked the attorney representing New York whether he agreed that 
a legislature was free to legalize PAS and he, too, left no doubt that he be-
lieved a legislature was so entitled. 5 
Nor did lawyers representing the plaintiffs in the PAS cases deny that 
they had always had the green light to seek legislation authorizing PAS. But 
they made it clear that they were not thrilled about pursuing such a course. 
Thus, when asked by Justice Breyer why a legislature was not "far more 
suited" to deal with end-of-life problems than a court interpreting a consti-
tutional provision, Professor Laurence Tribe, the attorney for the respon-
dents in Quill, responded that although "in a sense there are 50 laboratories 
out there," they "are now operating largely with the lights out."6 And when 
This essay originally appeared in 82 Minnesota Law Review 895 (April1998). 
Reprinted by permission. 
56 
Meaning and Impact of Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases· 57 
asked a similar question by Justice O'Connor, Kathryn Tucker, the attorney 
for the respondents in Glucksberg, replied that because "ours is a culture of 
denial of death," she had "some concerns that the political process would 
not be expected to work in a usual fashion. "7 
That the lawyers for the states, not the lawyers for the respondents, 
urged the Court to let the state legislatures resolve the difficult issues in-
volved in the PAS cases is hardly surprising. Proponents of PAS have not 
fared well in the political arena. They did achieve success in 1994 when Ore-
gon voters passed a "death with dignity" act (a vote Oregon reaffirmed three 
years later), but so far Oregon has been a striking exception. 
Washington and California ballot initiatives for "aid-in-dying" both 
failed in the early 1990s. Moreover, in the last decade bills to legalize PAS 
have been introduced in more than twenty states and none has passed.8 In-
deed, in 1997 alone seven state legislative attempts to legalize PAS "died out-
right or ... languished in committee."9 On the other hand, bills expressly 
prohibiting assisted suicide have fared much better. Since 1989, sixteen 
such bills have been enacted into law. 10 
Some have made much of the fact that five months after the Supreme 
Court handed down its decisions in the PAS cases, Oregon voters reaffirmed 
their support for assisted suicide by a much larger margin than the initial1994 
vote. The state legislature had put the initiative (which had initially passed by a 
51--49% vote) back on the ballot for an unprecedented second vote. This time 
the initiative was reaffirmed overwhelmingly, 60--40%. Barbara Coombs Lee 
hailed the event as "a turning point for the death with dignity movement."11 
David Garrow called the landslide vote "a good indicator of where America may 
be headed."12 Still another commentator viewed the lopsided vote as a demon-
stration of "[h]ow far, and how fast, public opinion is moving on this issue."13 
I think not. I think the most plausible explanation for the large margin 
by which Oregon voters rebuffed efforts to repeal the initiative in favor of 
PAS was their resentment and anger over the fact that the state legislature 
had forced them to vote on the issue again-the first time in state history 
that the legislature had tried to repeal a voter-passed initiative. Those run-
ning pro-PAS advertisements, we are told by the press, "play[ed] on the per-
ceived anger" generated by the repeal effort itself. 14 It is worth noting that a 
year after the second vote for assisted suicide in Oregon, a proposal to legal-
ize physician assisted suicide in Michigan was defeated by almost a 3-1 vote. 15 
What, If Anything, Has Changed? 
Some consider the long-awaited Supreme Court opinions in the PAS cases 
anticlimactic. 16 Dr. Robert Brody, a well-known medical ethicist at San 
Francisco General Hospital and a co-author of recently published guidelines 
permitting PAS under certain narrow circumstances, has gone so far as to 
say that the Court's rulings "didn't change a thing." 17 I strongly disagree. 
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To put the Supreme Court's rulings in the PAS cases in some perspec-
tive, let us go back a couple of years. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth 
and Second Circuits may have gladdened the hearts of PAS proponents when 
they ruled in the spring of 1996 that there was a constitutional right to as-
sisted suicide under certain circumstances, 18 but these decisions stunned 
many others. Until the two federal courts of appeals had handed down their 
rulings, within the span of a single month, no American appellate court had 
ever held that there was a right to assisted suicide under any circumstances. 
The decisions by the two courts generated a good deal of momentum in 
favor of physician-assisted suicide. The fact that the rulings came so close to-
gether, that there was no dissent in the Second Circuit case and that the de-
cision of the Ninth Circuit was supported by a lopsided majority (8-3) all 
contributed to this momentum. So did the directness and forcefulness of the 
two majority opinions. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit disparaged, almost ridiculed, two dis-
tinctions long relied on by opponents of PAS: (1) the distinction between 
"letting die" and actively intervening to promote or to bring about death; 
(2) the distinction between giving a patient a drug for the purpose of killing 
her and administering drugs for the purpose of relieving pain, albeit with the 
knowledge that such palliative care may hasten the patient's death. Ob-
served the Ninth Circuit: 
[W]e do not believe that the state's interest in preventing [PAS] is sig-
nificantly greater than its interest in preventing the other forms of life-
ending medical conduct that doctors now engage in regularly. More 
specifically, we see little, if any, difference for constitutional or ethical 
purposes between providing medication with a double effect and pro-
viding medication with a single effect, as long as one of the known ef-
fects in each case is to hasten the end of the patient's life. Similarly, 
we see no ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference between a 
doctors pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs 
which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his own life. In fact, 
some might argue that pulling the plug is a more culpable and aggres-
sive act on the doctor's part and provides more reason for criminal 
prosecution. To us, what matters most is that the death of the patient 
is the intended result as surely in one case as in the other .19 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit seemed unwilling to respect still another 
oft-made distinction, the one between assisted suicide (where the patient 
herself performs the last death-causing act) and active voluntary euthanasia 
(where a person other than the patient commits the death-causing act). Al-
though the court noted that there was no need to decide whether there was 
a constitutional right to, or liberty interest in, active voluntary euthanasia, as 
well as in PAS, the Ninth Circuit could not resist indicating how it would an-
swer that question if and when the occasion arose: "[F]or present purposes 
we view the critical line in right-to-die cases as the one between the volun-
Meaning and Impact of Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases · 59 
tary and involuntary termination of an individual's life .... We consider it 
less important who administers the medication than who determines 
whether the terminally ill person's life shall end."20 
In striking down, on equal protection grounds, New York's criminal pro-
hibition against assisted suicide insofar as it prevented physicians from help-
ing terminally ill, mentally competent patients commit suicide, the Second 
Circuit, if anything, was more outspoken than the Ninth: 
[T]here is nothing "natural" about causing death by [withdrawing life 
support]. The withdrawal of nutrition brings on death by starvation, 
the withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehydration, and the 
withdrawal of ventilation brings about respiratory failure. [Withdrawal 
of life support] is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide .... 
A finding of unequal treatment does not, of course, end the in-
quiry, unless it is determined that the inequality is not rationally re-
lated to some legitimate state interest. ... [But] what interest can the 
state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but 
ended? ... [And] what business is it of the state to require the continu-
ation of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable? What con-
cern prompts the state to interfere with a mentally competent pa-
tient's "right to define [his] own concept of existence, or meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life," when the patient 
seeks to have drugs prescribed to end life during the final stages of a 
terminal illness? The greatly reduced interest of the state in preserving 
life compels the answers to these questions: "None. "21 
As I hope I have made clear, both the Ninth and Second Circuits em-
ployed very strong and very quotable language-language that could be used 
quite effectively to advance the cause of PAS in editorials, op-ed pieces, talk 
shows, state legislatures and state courts. But then the U.S. Supreme Court 
entered the fray. It disagreed with the lower federal courts virtually point by 
point and, in effect, eradicated all the lower courts' forceful, felicitous, and 
stirring language (from the viewpoint of a PAS proponent at any rate). 
Nor is that all. Now that the Supreme Court has rejected their main 
constitutional arguments, at least for the near future, I believe that propo-
nents of PAS are in a weaker position than they were before these lawsuits 
ever commenced. For the constitutional arguments they made without suc-
cess in the Supreme Court and the policy arguments they have been mak-
ing, and will continue to make, in the state legislatures or state courts or on 
the op-ed pages of hundreds of newspapers greatly overlap. 
I realize that, although the highest court in the land did not recognize 
(or is not yet ready to recognize) a constitutional right to PAS, even under 
narrow circumstances, one may still argue that there is a common law or 
state constitutional right or a "moral" or "political" right to PAS. Neverthe-
less, it will be a good deal harder to engage in any kind of "rights talk" after 
the Supreme Court decisions than before. There are only so many argu-
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ments in favor of a "right" to PAS-and almost all of them were addressed by 
the Supreme Court in the Glucksberg and Quill cases. The Court, I think it 
fair to say, did not find any of them convincing. Thus those arguments have 
lost a considerable amount of credibility and will be easier to rebuff when 
made again, albeit in a different setting.22 
Addressing and Rejecting Four Principal Arguments 
in Favor of a Right to PAS 
At this point it may be useful to summarize briefly (1) the main arguments 
the Glucksberg and Quill plaintiffs made in assailing a total prohibition 
against PAS and (2) the reasons Chief Justice Rehnquist gave for rejecting 
each of these arguments (using the Chief Justice's own language wherever 
possible): 
Argument Withdrawal of life support is nothing more nor less than as-
sisted suicide; there is no significant moral or legal distinction between the 
two practices. The right to forgo unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment 
and the right to enlist a physician's assistance in dying by suicide are merely 
subcategories of the same broad right or liberty interest-controlling the time 
and manner of one's death or hastening one's death. 
Response The distinction between assisting suicide and terminating 
lifesaving treatment is "widely recognized and endorsed in the medical pro-
fession and in our legal traditions [and] is both important and logical. "23 The 
decision to commit suicide with a physician's assistance "may be just as per-
sonal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, 
but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are 
widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct. "24 
Argument There is no significant difference between administering 
palliative drugs with the knowledge that it is likely to hasten the patient's 
death and prescribing a lethal dose of drugs for the very purpose of killing 
the patient. As the Ninth Circuit put it, there is no real distinction between 
providing medication with a double effect and providing it with a single ef-
fect "as long as one of the known effects in each case is to hasten the end of 
the patient's life. "25 
Response In some cases, to be sure, "painkilling drugs may hasten a 
patient's death, but the physician's purpose and intent is, or may be, only to 
ease his patient's pain .... The law has long used actors' intent or purpose to 
distinguish between two acts that may have the same result. ... [T]he law 
distinguishes actions taken 'because of a given end [dispensing drugs in 
order to bring about death] from actions taken 'in spite of their unintended 
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but foreseen consequences [providing aggressive palliative care that may 
hasten death, or increase its risk.]"26 
Argument The 1990 Cruzan case is not simply a case about the right 
to forgo unwanted medical treatment. Considering the facts, it is really a 
case about personal autonomy and the right to control the time and manner 
of one's death. Cruzan's extension of the right to refuse medical treatment 
to include the right to forgo life-sustaining nutrition and hydration was "in-
fluenced by the profound indignity that would be wrought upon an uncon-
scious patient by the slow atrophy and disintegration of her body [and] can 
only be understood as a recognition of the liberty, at least in some circum-
stances, to physician assistance in ending one's life."27 
Response Cruzan is not a suicide or an assisted suicide case. The 
Court's assumption in that case was not based, as the Second Circuit sup-
posed, "on the proposition that patients have a general and abstract 'right to 
hasten death,' but on well established, traditional rights to bodily integrity 
and freedom from unwanted touching."28 Indeed, "[i]n Cruzan itself, we rec-
ognized that most States outlawed assisted suicide-and even more do 
today-and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment could be somehow transmuted into a right to as-
sistance in committing suicide."29 
Argument Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protects one's right to 
make intimate and personal choices, such as those relating to marriage, pro-
creation, child rearing-and the time and manner of one's death. As the Ninth 
Circuit observed, quoting language from Planned Parenthood v Casey: "Like 
the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when 
to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in 
a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy."'30 
Response The capacious, one might even say majestic, language in 
Casey-observing that "the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence ... and of the mystery of human life" is "at the heart of liberty"31 and 
noting that some important precedents in this area dealt with matters "in-
volving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy"32-simply "de-
scribed, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal 
activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in 
our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitution-
ally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "33 However, the fact that many of the rights and liberties protected by 
due process "sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping 
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are 
so protected, and Casey did not suggest otherwise."34 
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Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion 
I am well aware that in both Glucksberg and Quill Justice O'Connor pro-
vided the fifth vote (along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) to 
make the Chief Justice's opinions the opinions of the Court-by stating that 
she joined Rehnquist's opinion, yet writing separately. I am aware, too, that 
in large measure two other members of the Court, Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer, joined O'Connor's opinion. 
However, there is no indication in Justice O'Connor's brief concurring 
opinion that she found any of the principal arguments made by PAS propo-
nents any more persuasive than the Chief Justice did. There is no sugges-
tion, for example, that she reads the Cruzan opinion any more broadly than 
does the Chief Justice or that she interprets the stirring language in Casey 
any more expansively. Nor is there any suggestion that she has any more dif-
ficulty accepting the distinction between forgoing life-sustaining medical 
treatment and actively intervening to bring about death. Nor is there any 
reason to think that she has more trouble grasping the "double effect" prin-
ciple (the principle that explains why a doctor forbidden to administer a 
lethal dose of drugs for the very purpose of killing a patient may increase the 
dosage of medication needed to relieve pain even though the increased 
dosage is likely to hasten death or increase its risk). 
Indeed, in one respect at least Justice O'Connor may have gone a step 
further than the Chief Justice. I think she may be saying-she is certainly 
implying-that the "double effect" principle is not only plausible but neces-
sary. Her position (and Justice Breyer's as well) seems to be that if, for ex-
ample, a state were to prohibit the pain relief that a patient desperately 
needs when the increased dosage of medication is so likely to hasten death 
or cause unconsciousness that, according to the state, the procedure smacks 
of assisted suicide or euthanasia,35 she (presumably along with Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg) would want to revisit the question. 
Professor Cass Sunstein reads Justice O'Connor's opinion differently 
than I do. He believes that O'Connor "signaled the possible existence of a 
right to physician-assisted suicide in compelling circumstances."36 I think 
that is too broad a reading. 
Early in her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor does say that there is 
no need to address "the narrower question whether a mentally competent 
person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable 
interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death."37 
That comment would provide some support for Professor Sunstein's view-
if it were all Justice O'Connor had to say on the subject. But it is not. As her 
opinion continues, the general question about a constitutionally protected 
interest in controlling the circumstances of one's death is put aside and the 
opinion turns into a more narrow and more focused discussion about the lib-
erty interest in obtaining needed pain relief or in preventing a state from 
erecting legal barriers preventing access to such relief. 
Meaning and Impact of Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases · 63 
This is why, I believe, Justice O'Connor deems it important that the par-
ties and amici agree that the states of Washington and New York have im-
posed no legal barriers to pain relief.38 "In this light," she continues, "even 
assuming" that there is a constitutionally protected interest in controlling 
the circumstances of one's death, "the State's interests ... are sufficiently 
weighty to justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide."39 More-
over, at the end of her opinion, Justice O'Connor describes the "constitu-
tionally cognizable interest" rather narrowly: 
In sum, there is no need to address the question whether suffering pa-
tients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief 
from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their 
lives. There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New 
York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their 
deaths. 40 
In isolation, "obtaining relief from suffering" could mean assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia. In context, however, I think it means only a liberty in-
terest in obtaining pain relief. In light of her entire opinion, I believe Justice 
O'Connor's description of the constitutionally cognizable interest at the end 
of her opinion is more accurate than the one she refers to at the outset. Jus-
tice O'Connor's overall view appears to be that so long as a state erects no 
legal barriers to obtaining pain relief (even when the analgesics may hasten 
death or cause unconsciousness), the state's interests in protecting those 
who are not truly competent or whose wish to commit suicide is not truly 
voluntary (and the difficulties involved in defining "terminal illness" and as-
certaining who fits that category) are sufficiently strong to uphold a total ban 
against PAS. 41 
As best as I can tell, Justice Breyer, who joined Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion (except insofar as her opinion joined the majority) and also wrote sepa-
rately, took essentially the same position as O'Connor. Even assuming that 
there is something like a "right to die with dignity," Justice Breyer saw no 
need to decide whether such a right is "fundamental. "42 Why not? Because, 
as he saw it, "the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) 
would have to comprise an essential part of any successful claim"43 and "as 
Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force a dying patient 
to undergo that kind of pain. "44 
"Rather," continued Breyer, the laws of New York and Washington 
allow physicians to provide patients with pain-relieving drugs "despite the 
risk that those drugs themselves will kill."45 So long as this is the case, con-
cluded Breyer, laws prohibiting PAS "would overcome any remaining signif-
icant interests" making up a "dying with dignity" claim and thus withstand 
constitutional challenge.46 
Justice Breyer emphasized that the crucial question is not whether a 
patient is receiving adequate palliative care but whether state laws prevent 
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a patient from obtaining such care: "We [are] ... told that there are many 
instances in which patients do not receive the palliative care that, in princi-
ple, is available, but that is so for institutional reasons or inadequacies or ob-
stacles, which would seem possible to overcome, and which do not include a 
prohibitive set of laws. "47 
I believe some passages in Solicitor General Dellinger's amicus brief 
and some of his remarks during the oral arguments significantly illuminate 
the views of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer. 
Although the Solicitor General denied that "there is a broad liberty in-
terest in deciding the timing and manner of ones death, "48 he went on to say 
that the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause "is broad enough to en-
compass an interest on the part of terminally ill, mentally competent adults 
in obtaining relief from the kind of suffering experienced by the plaintiffs in 
this case. "49 Not only is a liberty interest implicated when a state inflicts se-
vere pain or suffering on someone, continued the Solicitor General, but also 
when a state "compels a person" to suffer severe pain caused by an illness by 
"prohibiting access to medication that would alleviate the condition."50 
During the oral arguments General Dellinger maintained: 
[A] person states a cognizable liberty interest when he or she alleges 
that the state is imposing severe pain and suffering or has adopted a 
rule which prevents someone from the only means of relieving that 
pain and suffering .... 
. . . [lfj one alleges the kind of severe pain and agony that is being 
suffered here and that the state is the cause of standing between you 
and the only method of relieving that, you have stated a constitution-
ally cognizable liberty interest. ... 51 
Kathryn Tucker, the lead lawyer for the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg 
case, addressed the Court immediately after General Dellinger. She was not 
pleased with the Solicitor General's description of the liberty interest at 
stake: "[T]he Solicitor General's comment that what were dealing with here 
is simply a liberty interest in avoiding pain and suffering ... absolutely trivi-
alizes the claim. We have a constellation of interests [including decisional 
autonomy and the interest in bodily integrity], each of great Constitutional 
dimension. "52 
It may well be that a liberty interest in obtaining pain relief or not being 
denied access to such relief is only a "trivialized" version of the liberty inter-
est really at stake. 53 But Justices O'Connor and Breyer (and presumably Jus-
tice Ginsburg as well, for she concurred in the judgments in both cases "sub-
stantially for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor"54) focused heavily, 
perhaps exclusively, on that trivialized or down-sized version. 
Since Justices Stevens and Souter, who also concurred in the judgments, 
seem even more receptive than O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer to arguments 
in favor of a right to PAS, at least in compelling cases, 55 there is reason to think 
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that at least five members of the Court are likely to resist state legislative ef-
forts to reject or to modify the "double effect" principle if such action would 
force some dying people to endure severe pain.56 Thus, although "Rehnquist's 
opinions did not endorse a constitutional right to adequate palliative care but 
simply rejected the conclusion of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals,"57 it may well be that "[a] Court majority" (the five concurring justices 
in Glucksberg and Quill) did effectively endorse such a right. 58 
In a sense, the Court's support for the "double effect" principle is a vic-
tory for everybody. For whatever position they may take on assisted suicide 
or euthanasia, surely most people want the dying and severely ill to suffer as 
little physical pain as possible. And as Howard Brody has observed: 
Clinicians need to believe to some degree in some form of the prin-
ciple of double effect in order to provide optimal symptom relief at 
the end of life .... A serious assault on the logic of the principle of 
double effect could do major violence to the (already reluctant and 
ill-informed) commitment of the mass of physicians to the goals of 
palliative care and hospice.59 
In a way, however, the showing of support for the "double effect" prin-
ciple by the highest court in the land was a special victory for opponents of 
assisted suicide and euthanasia. For they have long defended the principle. 
And they did so again in the Glucksberg and Quill cases. 
For example, in an amicus brief supporting the states of New York and 
Washington, the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Nurses 
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and some forty other med-
ical and health care organizations emphasized that a physician's obligation to 
relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity of dying patients '"in-
cludes providing palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten 
death."'60 The AMA (and the many other medical organizations that joined it) 
told the Supreme Court: "[The] recognition that physicians should provide 
pain medication sufficient to ease their pain, even where that may serve to 
hasten death, is vital to ensuring that no patient suffer from physical pain."61 
A good number of those favoring the legalization (or constitutionaliza-
tion) of PAS have sharply criticized the "double effect" principle. They have 
condemned the supposed hypocrisy in permitting the use of analgesics that 
hasten death while banning euthanasia. They have further maintained that 
killing to relieve suffering has already been sanctioned in the context of 
"risky pain relief. "62 
Moreover, it is worth recalling that it was the 8-3 majority of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that disparaged the "double effect" 
principle63-as Dr. Brody puts it, dismissing the principle as "moral 
hypocrisy. "64 
A robust version of the "double effect" principle-the view that even 
when the level of medication is likely to cause death, the "double effect" 
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principle may be constitutionally required-helps opponents of PAS, not 
proponents of the practice. For one of the main arguments against the legal-
ization of PAS is that "properly trained health care professionals can effec-
tively meet their patients' needs for compassionate end-of-life care without 
acceding to requests for suicide."65 The "double effect" principle eases the 
task of health care professionals-and eases the plight of their patients-and 
thus weakens the case for PAS. 
Some Final Thoughts on Justice O'Connor's 
Concurring Opinion 
Up to now, I have taken the position that if Justice O'Connor left the door 
open for future litigation in this area, she only left it open a small crack. But 
I must say that I find the reason she gave for joining the Chief Justice's opin-
ions quite baffling. At the outset of her concurring opinion she states that 
she is joining the Rehnquist opinions because she "agree[s] that there is no 
generalized right to 'commit suicide."'66 But nobody claimed that there was 
a "generalized right to commit suicide" or a general right to obtain a physi-
cian's assistance in doing so. Nobody. 67 
In their Supreme Court brief, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Wash-
ington case formulated the question presented as "[w]hether the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of liberty protects the decision of a mentally com-
petent, terminally ill adult to bring about impending death in a certain, hu-
mane, and dignified manner."68 Furthermore, Kathryn Tucker, the lead 
lawyer for the plaintiffs in the Washington case, began her oral argument by 
telling the Supreme Court that "this case presents the question whether 
dying citizens in full possession of their mental faculties at the threshold of 
death due to terminal illness have the liberty to choose to cross the thresh-
old in a humane and dignified manner."69 It is hard to see how anyone could 
emphasize death, dying, and terminal illness any more than that. 
Since one of the principal arguments made by opponents of PAS is that 
once established for terminally ill patients assisted suicide would not remain 
so limited for very long/0 it was not surprising that several Justices voiced 
doubts about whether the claimed right or liberty interest would or could or 
should be limited to those on the threshold of death. 71 But Ms. Tucker stood 
her ground. 
She told the Court that "we do draw the line at a patient who is con-
fronting death" because, unlike other individuals who wish to die by suicide, 
one on the threshold of death no longer has a choice between living and 
dying, but "only the choice of how to die. "72 She also recognized that a state 
may prevent a nonterminally ill person from choosing suicide because one 
day that person might "rejoice in that," but the same could not be said for 
the person who is terminally ill-for his or her life is about to end anyhow. 73 
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Moreover, when asked to define the liberty interest Dr. Quill and other 
plaintiffs in the New York case were claiming, Ms. Tucker's co-counsel, Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe, told the Court that it "is the liberty, when facing im-
minent and inevitable death, not to be forced by the government to en-
dure ... pain and suffering"; "the freedom, at this threshold at the end of 
life, not to be a creature of the state but to have some voice in the question 
of how much pain one is really going through."74 This caused Justice Scalia 
to respond, "Why does the voice just [arise] when death is imminent?"75 
From the outset of the litigation, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the 
Washington and New York cases insisted that the right or liberty interest 
they claimed was limited to the terminally ill because, among other reasons, 
I think they knew there was no appreciable chance that the courts would es-
tablish a general right to assisted suicide. Or, to put it somewhat differently, 
I think they knew that the only chance they had of prevailing in the courts 
was to ask for a narrowly limited right to PAS, one confined to the terminally 
ill. They were well aware that such a narrowly limited right would cause less 
alarm and command more support than a general right to assisted suicide. 
In short, if all that the Supreme Court decided last June is that there is 
no general right to commit suicide, the Court decided virtually nothing-be-
cause everybody agreed that there was no such right. 
Justice O'Connor observes that "[t]he Court frames the issue in this 
case as whether the Due Process Clause ... protects a 'right to commit sui-
cide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,' and concludes 
that our [history and legal traditions] do not support the existence of such a 
right."76 But this description of what "The Court" (or Chief Justice Rehn-
quist) did is incomplete. 
In describing the claim at issue in Glucksberg, the Ninth Circuit had 
used such language as "a constitutionally recognized 'right to die,"' "a due 
process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death," 
"a liberty interest in hastening one's own death,"77 "a strong liberty interest 
in choosing a dignified and humane death,"78 and an issue "deeply 
affect[ing] individuals' right to determine their own destiny."79 Apparently 
annoyed at what he apparently considered the Ninth Circuit's sloppy and 
emotive language, and perhaps displeased that in all its various descriptions 
of the claim at issue the Ninth Circuit had avoided the term "suicide" (a 
term that carries strongly negative associations), the Chief Justice main-
tained that a more careful statement of the question presented than any uti-
lized by the Ninth Circuit would be "whether the 'liberty' specially protected 
by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself in-
cludes a right to assistance in doing so."80 
I readily admit that this passage caused a certain amount of confusion. 
But it should not be forgotten that the Chief Justice pointed out at least three 
times that the Ninth Circuit had held that the challenged law "was unconsti-
tutional 'as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their 
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death with medication prescribed by their physicians."'81 And in the penulti-
mate paragraph of his opinion, the Chief Justice concluded: "We therefore 
hold that [the Washington law] does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
either on its face or 'as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to 
hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors. "'82 
The Washington statute was challenged by three terminally ill patients 
and four physicians who periodically treat terminally ill patients and who 
wished to help such patients die by suicide. Although the patients died dur-
ing the pendency of the case, the physicians remained. 
Justice O'Connor did not argue that the physician-plaintiffs "lacked 
standing" to challenge the constitutionality of the ban against PAS insofar as 
it applied to competent, terminally ill patients. In contrast, Justice Stevens, 
who wrote a separate concurring opinion, came close to saying just that. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit considered the Washington law as applied toter-
minally ill, competent adult patients who wished to hasten their deaths, ob-
served Stevens, all the patient-plaintiffs had died by then and therefore the 
court of appeals' holding "was not limited to a particular set of plaintiffs be-
fore it."83 But Stevens's statement is incomplete. 
To be sure, the physician-plaintiffs were not threatened with prosecu-
tion for assisting in the suicide of a particular patient. As the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out, however, "they ran a severe risk of prosecution under the 
Washington statute, which proscribes the very conduct in which they seek to 
engage."84 Moreover, although Justice Stevens did not discuss this aspect of 
the case, both the district court and the court of appeals proceeded on the 
basis that the physician-plaintiffs had standing to sue on behalf of their ter-
minally ill patients as well as on their own behalf. 85 This is hardly surprising; 
the U.S. Supreme Court has frequently permitted physicians to assert their 
patients' rights in challenging abortion restrictions.86 Moreover, it might be 
said that the Washington statute is aimed more directly at physicians than at 
their patients. It does not make committing suicide with the assistance of 
another a felony. It makes aiding another to commit suicide a felony. 
If physicians lacked standing to challenge laws prohibiting assisted sui-
cide, how could appellate courts ever consider an "as applied to terminally ill 
patients" challenge? All terminally ill patients necessarily will die prior to 
completion of the litigation. In fact, in the Clucks berg case all but one of the 
patient-plaintiffs had died by the time the district court issued its decision. 
What is the most plausible explanation for Justice O'Connor's odd state-
ment that she is joining the Chief Justice's opinions in Glucksberg and Quill 
because she "agree[s] that there is no generalized right to 'commit sui-
cide"'87 (an odd statement, certainly, in light of the history of the case and 
against the background of the briefs and the oral arguments)? Although this 
is a conclusion that I am not eager to reach, I think the reason for Justice 
O'Connor's statement is a reluctance to rule out the possibility of a right to 
PAS in every set. of circumstances and a desire to "proceed with special cau-
tion" in this area.88 
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The Next Time Around 
I have to agree with the many Court watchers who say (especially those who 
were unhappy with the result in the assisted suicide cases) that Glucksberg 
and Quill will not be the Court's last word on the subject. But it hardly fol-
lows that the next time the Court confronts the issue it will establish a right 
to assisted suicide in some limited form. There were a number of factors at 
work when the Supreme Court decided the 1997 PAS cases and most of 
them will still be operating when the Court addresses the issue a second 
time. 
For one thing, the issue has recently been the subject of intense discus-
sion and vigorous debate and there is no indication this agitation will subside 
in the foreseeable future. As the Chief Justice observed (and concurring 
Justice O'Connor agreed), "[p]ublic concern and democratic action are 
... sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the 
end of life, with the result that there have been many significant changes in 
state laws and in the attitudes these laws reflect."89 
For another thing, the rights of a politically vulnerable group are not at 
stake-as had been the situation when the Court intervened in prior cases.90 
Mter all, "[d]ying people are clearly not a discrete and insular minority in the 
same, sure way as are black people subject to race discrimination laws [or] 
women subject to abortion restrictions. "91 And when the issue is close and 
"there is no democratic defect in the underlying political process," courts 
"should not strike down reasonable legislative judgments. "92 
I think Justice O'Connor put it well when, reiterating a point she made 
during the oral arguments, 93 she commented: 
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family 
member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic 
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of ter-
minally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end 
their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might 
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure. 94 
Another reason, quite likely, for the Court's reluctance to establish a 
constitutionally protected right to, or liberty interest in, assisted suicide, and 
one that will apply the next time around as well, is capsuled in the Solicitor 
General's amicus brief: once an exception to the general prohibition against 
PAS is mandated by the Court, however heavily circumscribed it might be at 
first, "there is no obvious stopping point. "95 
For example, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the state's assisted suicide 
ban "only 'as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten 
their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors."'96 Mter 
noting Washington State's insistence that the impact of the Ninth Circuit's 
decision "will not and cannot be so limited,"97 the Chief Justice observed: 
70 · Law at the End of Life 
The [Ninth Circuit's] decision, and its expansive reasoning, provide 
ample support for the State's concerns. The court noted, for example, 
that the "decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for 
all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself," that "in some 
instances, the patient may be unable to self-administer the drugs 
and ... administration by the physician ... may be the only way the 
patient may be able to receive them," and that not only physicians, but 
also family members and loved ones, will inevitably participate in as-
sisting suicide. Thus, it turns out that what is couched as a limited 
right to "physician-assisted suicide" is likely, in effect, a much broader 
license, which could prove extremely difficult to solve and contain.98 
Although concurring Justice Ginsburg neither joined the Chief Justice's 
opinion nor wrote an opinion of her own,99 during the oral arguments she 
voiced skepticism that any right to PAS, no matter how narrowly limited ini-
tially, could or would be confined to the terminally ill or could or would stop 
short of active voluntary euthanasia. 
When Kathryn Tucker, lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Glucksberg, 
urged the Court to recognize, or to establish, a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest "that involves bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and the 
right to be free of unwanted pain and suffering,"100 Justice Ginsburg retorted 
that "a lot of people would fit [this] category," not just the terminally ill. 101 
How, she wondered, do you "leave out the rest of the world who would fit the 
same standards?"102 At another point, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the 
patient who is so helpless or in so much agony that she "is not able to assist 
in her own suicide," but must have a health professional administer a lethal 
injection, is "in a more sympathetic situation" than one who is able to com-
mit suicide with the preliminary assistance of a physician. 103 
Still another factor that must have had some impact on at least some 
members of the Court and is bound to influence at least some of the Justices 
in future cases, is the strong opposition of the AMA and other medical 
groups to the constitutionalization or legalization of PAS, regardless of how 
narrowly limited the constitutional right or the statutory authorization might 
be. As Linda Greenhouse has pointed out, 104 the amicus brief filed by the 
AMA in Glucksberg and Quill sharply contrasted with the one the same or-
ganization had filed seven years earlier in the Cruzan case. 105 In Cruzan, the 
AMA told the Court that under the circumstances, terminating life support 
was in keeping with "respecting the patient's autonomy and dignity." 106 In 
Glucksberg and Quill, however, the AMA (and more than forty other na-
tional and state medical and health care organizations) told the Court that 
"[t]he ethical prohibition against physician-assisted suicide is a cornerstone 
of medical ethics"; the AMA had repeatedly "reexamined and reaffirmed" 
that ethical prohibition, and had done so as recently as the summer of 1996; 
and that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide remains 'fundamentally incompatible 
with the physician's role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to con-
trol, and would pose serious societal risks."' 107 
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Recent and continuing trends in medical practice may only heighten 
the AMA's resistance to PAS. The next time the issue is presented, the AMA 
and other medical groups might well tell the Court, as two commentators 
have recently argued, that new trends and developments make the need to 
maintain the absolute prohibition against PAS "more important than 
ever."108 It would not be surprising if the next time around the AMA and 
other medical groups were to tell the Court something like this: 
Given the great pressures threatening medical ethics today-includ-
ing, among other factors, a more impersonal practice of medicine, the 
absence of a lifelong relationship with a physician, the push toward 
managed care, and the financially-based limitation of services-a 
bright line rule regarding medically-assisted death is a bulwark against 
disaster. 109 
Finally, another factor at work in the assisted suicide cases, and one 
that will operate as well the next time the Court confronts the issue, is the 
Justices' realization that if they were to establish a right to assisted suicide, 
however limited, the need to enact legislation implementing and regulating 
any such right would generate many problems-which inevitably would find 
their way back to the Court. 
Whether a regulatory mechanism would be seen as providing patients 
and physicians with much-needed protection or viewed as unduly burdening 
the underlying right would be largely in the eye of the beholder. 110 Thus it is 
not surprising that proponents of PAS even disagree among themselves as to 
how a particular procedural requirement should be regarded. 
For example, three of the nation's most respected proponents of PAS, 
Franklin Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy Quill, have questioned the de-
sirability of the fifteen-day waiting period required by the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act, a provision designed to ensure that a patient's decision to elect 
assisted suicide is resolute. 111 According to Miller, Brody and Quill, such an 
"arbitrary time period ... may be highly burdensome for patients who are 
suffering intolerably and may preclude access to assisted death for those 
who request it at the point when they are imminently dying. "112 The same 
three commentators also criticize a provision of a Model State Act requiring 
that the discussion between physician and patient concerning a request for 
assisted suicide be witnessed by two adults, 113 calling it "unduly intrusive 
and unlikely to be effective."114 On the other hand, Miller, Brody, and Quill 
maintain that an Oregon provision requiring a second medical opinion on 
the assisted suicide decision is "not a reliable safeguard" because it "does not 
mandate that the consulting physician be genuinely independent." 115 
Perhaps the most rigorous condition on PAS to be found is the require-
ment of Compassion in Dying that the approval of all of the would-be sui-
cide's immediate family members be obtained. 116 It is hard to believe that 
any group favoring PAS would retain such a requirement if the Court were 
to establish a constitutional right to assisted suicide. But one can be fairly 
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sure that if the Court were to establish such a right, opponents of PAS would 
fight hard to include a "family approval" provision in any legislation regulat-
ing assisted suicide-along with mandatory waiting periods, specified infor-
mation and procedures to ensure that the decision to choose PAS is "truly 
informed," and all sorts of notification requirements and bans on the use of 
public facilities, public employees, and public funds. 117 
Although not insubstantial, the differences among proponents of PAS 
over the requisite conditions and procedures for carrying out the practice 
pale compared to the differences likely to exist between those who disagree 
about legalizing PAS in the first place. In short, in many respects the legisla-
tive response to a Supreme Court decision establishing a right to assisted 
suicide is likely to be a replay of the response to Roe v Wade, 118 a specter that 
did not escape the attention of the Justices last year. 
At one point in the oral arguments, the Chief Justice told the lead 
lawyer for the Glucksberg plaintiffs: 
You're not asking that [this Court engage in legislation] now. But 
surely that's what the next couple of generations are going to have to 
deal with, what regulations are permissible and what not if we uphold 
your position here .... [Y]ou're going to find the same thing ... that 
perhaps has happened with the abortion cases. There are people who 
are just totally opposed and people who are totally in favor of them. So 
you're going to have those factions fighting it out in every session of 
the legislature, how far can we go in regulating this. And that will be a 
constitutional decision in every case. 119 
Roe v Wade ignited what has aptly been called a "domestic war," 120 one 
that, after a quarter-century of tumult, seems finally to have come to an end 
in the courts. The Court that decided the assisted suicide cases in 1997 was 
not eager to set off a new domestic war. Neither, I venture to say, will the 
Court be the next time around. 
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